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SUMMARY OF AGRUMENT 
Bennett was an unlicensed cement finisher previously 
an employee of Johnson and working on the date of injury 
with another previous employee of Johnson, performing Johnson's 
subcontract with Matthews, the general contractor who retained 
right of control over Johnson and Johnson, in turn, retained 
right of control over Bennett and co-worker, constituting 
Bennett a statutory employee. 
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OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT N. BENNETT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs 
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OF UTAH, JOHNSON BROTHERS 
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Case No. 20705 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a Complaint and Petition for Writ of 
Review of the Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order 
of an Administrative Law Judge which were adopted and approved 
by The Industrial Commission of Utah. This appeal is pursuant 
to jurisdiction provided by 35-1-83, Utah Code Annotated 
relating to review by the Supreme Court of orders of the 
Commission. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff, employee, seeks reversal of the Order 
which found him to be an independent contractor who was 
not entitled to workmen's compensation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff testified, and the law judge found 
that on or about February 27, 1984, he, Robert Bennett, 
was working at the instance of Johnson Brothers Construction 
in the performance of work contracted for by Johnson as 
subcontractor for the general contractor, C.L. Mathews 
Construction. Another person referred to as Don Russell 
by affidavit and as Don Crummit in testimony was pounding 
a nail which glanced and flipped into the left eye of the 
plaintiff resulting in damage requiring surgery and partial 
loss of vision (R93). The plaintiff lost 12 weeks of work 
at $216.45 compensable rate entitlement or $2,597.40 wages, 
and incurred medical expenses of $4,380.17. Plaintiff 
will require further medical attention to his left eye 
which has clouded vision and may require a lens transplant 
(R90, Exhibit A). 
The defendants contended that plaintiff was an 
independent contractor and not an employee. 
Johnson Brothers Construction (Johnson) was a 
business entity operated by three brothers, two of whom 
were Jay and Chris who dealt with Bennett (R53). None 
of the Johnsons testified at the hearing in November 1984, 
but Chris supplied an affidavit dated December 12, 1984, 
which recited that Johnsons had previously done concrete 
work for C.L. Mathews Construction and were requested to 
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perform at 150 North Main Street, Salt Lake City; that 
Bennett had previously been employed by Johnsons and Chris 
knew that Bennett was looking for work; that Chris told 
Don Russell (Crummit) and Bennett that if they wanted to 
do the job as independent contractors they would receive 
the money that Mathews was to pay to divided between Don 
and Bennett; that on February 27, 1984, neither Don nor 
Bennett had previously been given a nblue slip'1 by Johnson 
and was never rehired; and that to his knowledge, Bennett 
was drawing unemployment (R31-32 Affidavit). Don did not 
appear to testify, but by his affidavit also dated December 
12, 1984, it was stated that Don worked with Bennett at 
150 North Main, Salt Lake City, ; that he was familiar 
with requirements in accomplishing construction work, but 
was not working as an employee of Johnson at the time although 
previously an employee of Johnson; that he did not employ 
Bennett to assist him on this job but it was his understanding 
that both were independent contractors to perform the job 
and divide the money equally (R29-30 Affidavit). 
Chris L. Matthews testified that he was a general 
contractor constructing residences as an individual proprietor 
(R69). An architect for the Kimball Condominium at 150 
North Main had engaged Matthews to work inside the building 
and to remove and replace a concrete drive slab 5 X 40 
feet outside the building under a cost-plus verbal agreement. 
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Matthews contacted Chris and Jay Johnson and informed them 
at the site what was to be done. Matthews was to supply 
the jackhammer compressor and the concrete (R72) and the 
estimated pay to Johnsons would be about $400.00 Matthews 
believed that Jay and Chris Johnson would personally perform 
and did not know they intended to have others do the work 
(R73,77, and R79). Matthews told Johnsons where to get 
the jackhammer and where to order the cement (R74) but 
he never knew Don or Bennett. Matthews said he did not 
supervise the job or exercise any control and paid the 
bill of $406.00 to Johnsons (R76). Matthews said that 
the architect gave no instructions to Johnsons but that 
all instructions came from Matthews (R80) as expected by 
the architect and Kimball that whatever instruction and 
supervision was necessary to get the job done would be 
provided by Matthews. Matthews then answered questions 
as follows: 
Q And if you came down while they were doing 
the job and something was different from your instruct-
ions, you could have told them to do it differently, 
couldn't you? 
A Yes, I could. 
Q So whatever had to be done was up to you 
to get the instructions that it would be done properly? 
A It was up to Chris and Jay Johnson at that 
point. I'd subcontracted to him, he had an obligation 
to fulfill that by me. Technically it was his respon-
sibility after the point of negotiating. 
Q And if you had come by to inspect, and it 
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wasn't being done that way, you'd have the right to 
tell them how to do it; isn't that true? 
A Well, I would have had the right to point 
out his problems and have him correct it, if he wanted 
to fulfill his contract. (R81) 
Bennett testified in his own behalf and his testimony 
was not contradicted except as noted herein. Bennett said 
that he had been a cement finisher for about six years 
and at the time of the hearing (November 1984) was working 
as a cement finisher for a contractor. He had worked for 
Johnsons from May 1983 to November 25, 1983, until he was 
released because of weather conditions and a reduction 
in force (R37). He did other jobs for Johnsons with Don 
Crummit, during December 1983, and January 1984, for which 
he was to be paid cash without payroll deductions, but 
was never in fact paid for these jobs (R38, R63,). He 
said Don was an employee of Johnsons (this was disputed 
by Johnson's affidavit). About a week before the injury 
date of February 27, 1984, Chris Johnson personally contacted 
Bennett and advised Bennett that Chris had taken Don to 
see the job which was to be done by Bennett and Don on 
a fee splitting basis but that Bennett had no previous 
arrangement with Don (R39). The first time Bennett saw 
the job was when he rode with Don in Don's truck to pick 
up the jackhammer at a rental place in Bountiful charged 
to Matthews (R40). Johnsons were to tell Don and Bennett 
where and when to order the concrete (R42). Don and Bennett 
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had completed the removal of the old concrete, cleaned 
the equipment, and proceeded to build a protective barricade 
at the entrance. Don hit a 16-penney duplex nail which 
flipped into Bennetts eye (R43) knocking the lens on an 
angle, and when he pulled out the nail, part of the coloring 
came with it distorting the shape of his eye (R48). 
Johnsons visited the site twice during the 
performance, and discussed whether more fill material should 
be placed what was taking them so long, and how the slope 
or grade would be constituted (R44). Bennett did not 
know who paid Don, but Johnsons discussed with Bennett 
at the hospital the payment of $100.00 to Bennett because 
Jay Johnson would have to go down with Don to pour and 
finish the cement (R45). Later when Bennett arrived home 
from the hospital, Chris Johnson showed up with a check 
for $150.00 and said if he would come back to work for 
them Johnsons would help with the bills (R46). Bennett 
had no contact with Matthews (R50). Bennett said he had 
not started his own construction company and while he had 
prepared papers for his license, he was waiting for a check 
from Johnsons to pay the filing fee (R53). He opened a 
checking account as "Bob Bennett Construction" in December 
1984 (R54) but said that the checking account was meaningless 
(R53). An exhibit at R23 shows a bank statement reflecting 
a deposit to $200.00 and checks drawn of $155.00. In response 
to questions of the law judge, Bennett stated that he performed 
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on this job on a Friday and a Monday but Johnsons did not 
specify the time of day he should be working, but that Johnsons 
told Bennett "that Don would be picking me up in the mornings 
and taking me down. Ifd ride down with Don because he 
knew what had to be done on the job11 (R85). 
On the job in which he was injured, Bennet was 
riding with Don in Don's truck and using Donfs tools (R61). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
BENNETT WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF BOTH JOHNSON 
AND MATTHEWS. 
Matthews was the general contractor who subcontracted 
the removal and replacement of the concrete slab to Johnsons 
under a verbal contract with general oral specifications 
and an agreement of Matthews to supply the jackhammer for 
removal as well as to furnish the concrete for replacement 
(R72). Matthews specified where to rent the jackhammer 
and from whom to order the cement (R74). Matthews testified 
that by his agreement with the owner he was expected to 
give whatever instruction and supervision were necessary 
to get the job done, and stated that he had the right at 
any time to require Johnsons to follow his instructions 
and to tell them how to do it (R80-81). 
In the case of Pinter Construction Company v 
Clifford P. Frisby and the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
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678 P—305, (February 7, 1984) this court stated: 
"It is not the actual exercise of control that determines 
whether an employer-employee relationship exists; it is 
the right to control that is determinative. Hinds v 
Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., Utah, 577 P—561 (1978); 
Brambrough v Bethers, Utah, 552 P—128 (1976);...Pinter 
also maintained control over the materials used on the 
job since Frisby could acquire materials only after 
receiving payment from Pinter.11 
Matthews acknowledged his right to control and to furnish 
tools and materials and thereby became an employer of both 
Johnsons and Bennett under Section 35-1-42(2) Utah Code 
Annotated as also stated in the Pinter case: 
"The question on appeal is whether Frisby was a 
statutory "employee" as that term is used in 35-1-42(2), 
which states in relevant part: 
Where any employer procures any work to be done 
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose 
work he retains supervision or control, and such 
work is a part or process in the trade or business 
of the employer, such contractor, and all persons 
employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, 
and all persons employed by any such subcontractors, 
shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section, 
employees of such original employer. (Emphasis suppli 
Thus, if an employer hires a contractor, that contractor, 
his employees, and all subcontractors under him are 
"employees" if (1) the employer controls or supervises the 
contractor's work, and (2) such work is a part or process 
in the employee1 s trade or business." 
POINT II 
JOHNSON EXERCISED ACTUAL CONTROL OVER 
BENNETT AND CO-WORKER. 
Although by affidavit of Jay Johnson and Don 
Russell (Crummit) they stated as a conclusion that Bennett 
and Don were independent contractors, the facts do not 
support such a conclusion. Neither Don nor Bennett were 
licensed contractors even though Bennett had made preliminary 
preparations for a license without actually filing for the 
same. However, even a licensed contractor is the employee 
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of a person who has the right to control his performance 
(Pinter, supra). 
Bennett's testimony was uncontradicted as to 
his statements that Chris Johnson had shown the job to 
Don a week before (R39); Bennett first saw the job the 
day he rode in Don's truck to pick up the jackhammer (R40); 
Chris Johnson was supposed to tell them to call for the 
concrete and where to order it (R42); Johnsons appeared 
at the site twice during removal of the concrete and discussed 
whether more fill should be added and why it was taking 
Don and Bennett so long (R43, R44); Bennett was using Don's 
tools (R62); Don was paid by someone other than Bennett 
(R45); and Johnson only offered Bennett $100 for his performance 
up to the time of injury because Johnson had to assist 
Don in pouring the concrete (R45). 
None of the foregoing facts indicates that Bennett 
was an independent contractor, but do constitute him as 
an employee under the statute. 
POINT III 
WHETHER BENNETT WAS DRAWING UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION OR NOT IS NOT DETERMINATIVE 
OF THE LEGAL ISSUE AS TO HIS STATUS AS A 
STATUTORY EMPLOYEE. 
Bennett has previously been an hourly employee 
of Johnsons and was terminated shortly before December 
31, 1983 (R37). Thereafter Bennett worked for Johnsons 
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on an agreement for cash payment but was never in fact 
paid anything while he was drawing compensation (R63). 
Bennett stopped collecting unemployment payments one week 
before his injury (R65). There are no legal authorities 
which state that even if a person collected unemployment 
compensation that this would relieve an employer from the 
duty of providing for workmens compensation or that he 
thereby becomes an independent contractor. Nor does logic 
so dictate. 
CONCLUSION 
Bennett was a statutory employee of both Matthews, 
the general contractor and Johnsons, the subcontractor, 
under oral subcontract, where both Matthews and Johnsons 
had the right to control the performance and Johnsons did 
in fact exercise actual control. The order of the Commission 
should be reversed and the Commission should be directed 
to enter an appropriate award for Bennett as a statutory 
employee. 
Dated this M day of July, 1985. 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify I mailed four copies to each of the 
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following: 
Erik M. Ward 
Attorney at Law 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Carvel R. Shaffer 
Attorney at Law 
453 West 500 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Corrections delivered to said counsel on July , 19#5 
George K. Fadel 
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ADDENDUM 
$5-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined j - Refularly employed *~ 
Independent contractors. The following shall constitute employers subject to the 
provisions of this title: 
(1) The state, and each county, city, town and school district therein in the 
state. 
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, including every public utility, 
having in service one or more workmen or operatives regularly employed in the 
same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, 
express or implied, oral or written, except agricultural employers who meet any 
o n e
 9l the following conditions: (a) whose employees are all members of the imme-
3Iate family of the employer, .which employer has a proprietary interest in the 
farm; (fe) whose easfc payments ie one or mere employees amounted te lees than |££(tt during the preceding calendar year; ; provided that the inclusion of any 
Immediate family member ujider the provisions of this title is at the option ot the 
employer or te) (b) who do net"employ *t feast leur five or" fewer persons otKer 
than immediate family members for #erty 40 hours or more per week per each 
employee for thirteen 13 consecutive weeks during any part of the preceding twelve 
12 months; apd except domestic employers who do not employ one employee or 
more than one employee at least forty 40 hours per week; provided, that employers 
of agricultural laborers and domestic servants, shall have the right to come under 
the terms of this title by complying with the provisions thereof and the rules and 
regulations of the commission. ' 
The term "regularly" as herein used shall include all employments in the usual 
course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer, whether 
continuous throughout the year or for only a portion of the year. 
Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for him 
by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and such work 
is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor, and 
all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, and all persons 
employed by any such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this 
section, employees of such original employer. Any person, firm or corporation 
engaged in the performance of work as an independent contractor shall be deemed 
an employer within the meaning of this section. The term 'Independent contrac-
tor," as herein used, is defined to be any person, association or corporation engaged 
in the performance of any work for another, who, while so engaged, is independent 
of the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject 
to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in the performance of a 
definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting 
a result in accordance with the employer's design. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 84000226 
84000227 
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HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on November 5, 
1984 at 1:00 p.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by George K. 
Fadel, Attorney at Law. 
The defendant, Johnson Brothers Construction, was 
represented by Carvel R. Shaffer, Attorney at Law. 
The defendant, C. L. Mathews Construction, was 
represented by Erik M. Ward, Attorney at Law. 
The issues presented in this matter are as follows: 
1. Whether the applicant, Robert N. Bennett, was an employee of 
Johnson Brothers Construction or an independent contractor and 
2. Whether C. L. Mathews Construction has any liability in this 
matter as a statutory employer. 
There was no evidence presented which would suggest a medical issue 
in this matter. With regard to the two issues presented, the Administrative 
Law Judge is of the opinion that the findings of fact with regard to the first 
issue will be dispositive in this matter, thus eliminating the need for 
consideration of the second issue presented. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant in this matter, Robert N. Bennett, is a trained cement 
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finisher and, at the time of the Evidentiary Hearing, was employed by another 
construction company in the same capacity. 
The applicant began work for Johnson Brothers Construction in May of 
1983 as a cement finisher. At that time, he was paid as a regular employee 
and was terminated as an employee in November of 1983, due to a reduction in 
force. After his termination, the applicant commenced to collect unemployment 
benefits. He continued to collect these benefits until his accident in 
February of 1984. 
In December of 1983, the applicant set up a checking account at 
Clearfield Bank under the name of Bob Bennett Construction. According to the 
applicant's testimony, that checking account was set up with the understanding 
that the applicant was going to take out his contractors license and become an 
independent contractor. He informed the Johnson Brothers that this was his 
intention. The applicant did not, however, complete filling out the necessary 
papers from the contractor's division of the Utah Business Regulations 
Department prior to his accident. Throughout December, the applicant did 
three or four small jobs for the defendants. The payment arrangement was that 
he would be paid in a lump sum per job and that he would be paid cash. No 
taxes or social security were deducted from these amounts. It was the 
testimony of the applicant that the payments were worked this way so that the 
sums would not be reported to the Employment Security Division of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah and result in an interruption of his 
unemployment benefits. 
In February of 1984, the defendants, Johnson Brothers Construction, 
subcontracted with the defendant C. L. Mathews Construction to do a concrete 
driveway. It was arranged between those two parties that the cost for the 
entire job would be approximately $400.00 and that C. L. Mathews Construction 
would provide the rental equipment and the concrete. The defendants, Johnson 
Brothers, Construction determined they did not have time to do the job and 
contacted the applicant and another former employee and asked them if they 
would like to do the job for a set sum. The applicant and the other gentlemen 
agreed to do the work. The job involved breaking out a large 5 foot bv 40 
foot slab of concrete, removing the old pieces, and pouring a new slab. The 
applicant did not inspect the job site prior to the first day of working on 
the site, but the other individual did. All arrangements between the parties 
were verbal. The work was begun on the project the day before the applicant's 
injury. They arrived at the work site with a rented jackhammer and proceeded 
to break out large slabs of the concrete. They also had to do some fill in 
work to raise the driveway to the proper level. 
On February 27, 1984, the applicant rode with the other individual in 
his truck to the work site. They had completed removing all the concrete and 
done the subgrading. The defendant, Johnson Brothers appeared at the site 
twice to see how the work was coming along and to check the specifications. 
The applicant and the other individual had finished all of the clean up work 
and were in the process of building barricades to block the driveway off. The 
applicant did not have his tools with him that day and the other individual 
was building the barricades. As that individual struck a nail, it flipped 
ROBERT N. BENNETT 
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into the applicants right eye. An ambulance was called and the applicant was 
taken to L.D.S. Hospital. Surgery was performed on the applicant that same 
evening. 
While the applicant was in the hospital recovering, the defendants, 
Johnson Brothers, offered the applicant a $150.00 check made out to Bob 
Bennett Construction. The applicant did not cash this check. At the time of 
the hearing, the applicant still had a clouded lense and it was suggested that 
he would eventually need a lense transplant. The applicant was released to go 
back to work on May 29, 1984 by his treating physician. 
After a thorough review of the transcript in this matter, the 
Administrative Law Judge is of the opinion that the applicant was in fact an 
independent contractor when he sustained his injuries. The applicant had 
established a checking account with the intent of becoming an independent 
contractor. The evidence introduced indicated that the account was opened in 
December, a considerable period of time before the applicant's industrial 
accident. The fact that the applicant had not actually completed the paper 
work necessary to become a contractor is not particularly telling. The 
Administrative Law Judge looks at the intent of the applicant and the 
understanding of the defendants, Johnson Brothers, with regard to the 
applicant's status. The applicant was to be paid to do the job on which he 
was injured in a lump sum amount which he was to split with the other 
independent contractor on the job. His hours were not set by Johnson 
Brothers. He was merely given specifications and the times within which the 
particular job had to be completed. The applicant was collecting unemployment 
during the time in which he was performing this particular job. In addition, 
he had performed similar jobs for the defendant, Johnson Brothers Construction 
during the months of December. The same arrangements had been made with those 
jobs. The applicant was paid cash to do them with no interruption of his 
unemployment benefits. This fact is verified on pages 27-32 of the 
transcript. On those other jobs that the applicant performed for the 
defendant, he provided all of his own tools, including his truck and his own 
finishing tools. There appears to be little difference between those jobs and 
the one on which the applicant was injured. The arrangement with all of the 
jobs (as indicated on page 27 of the transcript) indicated that the applicant 
was aware that he was to be paid a lump sum for the job with no taxes 
deducted. The intent of the applicant was obviously to be an independent 
contractor. The Administrative Law Judge would comment that the applicant in 
this matter seems to want to have the best of both worlds i.e. the freedom to 
set his own hours, not to have taxes or other mandatory deductions made from 
his wages, continue his unemployment benefits, but be fully covered for 
worker's compensation purposes by a sub-contractor. The Administrative Law 
Judge is further of the opinion that the defendants in this matter did not 
exercise a demonstrable amount of control over the work project. They only 
made two inspection visits to the site to determine if the specifications were 
being met. The provision of all of the materials was actually made by the 
general contractor. After his termination in November of 1983, the applicant 
was perfectly free to contract with any other individuals for his services. 
His testimony indicated that he was, in fact, looking for work in other places 
between the times he did work for the Johnson Brothers. The Administrative 
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Law Judge is fully aware of the case law in this matter (notably Pinter 
Construction Company v. Clifford P. Frisby and L. Jack Graham v. R. Thorn 
Foundation K but the situation in the instant matter is notably different in 
that the applicant was collecting unemployment benefits during periods of time 
when he was completing a number of small private jobs for Johnson Brothers 
Construction. These were small jobs which were paid for in set lump sums. 
There was no continuous ongoing work with the defendants. The applicant 
agreed to complete the job within a designated time; he was paid in a lump 
sum, rather than by the hour and without any of the payroll deductions which 
would be applicable to an employee. It is the opinion of the Administrative 
Law Judge that since the applicant retained responsibility for paying all 
taxes and supervision over his own time, the applicant must also be held 
responsible for the provision of his own insurance. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant in this matter, Robert N. Bennett, was an independent 
contractor on the date of his industrial accident of February 27, 1984 and is 
not entitled to worker's compensation benefits from Johnson Brothers 
Construction or C.L. Mathews Construction. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the application of Robert N. Bennett for 
benefits from the defendants, Johnson Brothers Construction and C.L. Mathews 
Construction, be, and the same are hereby, dismissed. 
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